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Time Through Time:  
Its Evolution through Western Philosophy in 7 Ideas  
To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow, 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
(Macbeth) 
 The universe seems drenched in time. Through time, trees inch upwards, galaxies coalesce, 
empires rise and decay. But what is time? Everything changes over time, and that includes our idea 
of time itself. Philosophers have fused time with the stars, with God, with space. Our tale of time in 
Western philosophy starts over 2,300 years ago - in the back garden of a house in Athens.  
1 Starry Time 
 Plato’s Timaeus describes friends celebrating a festival, likely Athena’s summer feast. I 
picture them breathing olive trees, Socrates’ beard lit by moonlight, faint music drifting over the 
wall. An astronomer called Timaeus dominates the conversation, telling a creation story. (We learn 
the universe is like a living creature, formed from fire, earth, air, and water.) Along the way, he talks 
about time. 
 Timaeus picks out some heavenly bodies: the sun, the moon, and five stars. He tells us these 
‘wanderers’ came to be in order to ‘stand guard’ over time (Plato, trans. 1997, Tim 38c). What does 
that mean?  
 Many of the ways we think about time involve the heavens. A day stretches from sunrise to 
sunset. Every hour the sun curves a little further through the sky, shifting shadows measurable on a 
sundial. A year is one full revolution of the earth around the sun, stars slipping in and out of view.  
 The movements of the sun and stars are intertwined with measuring time. By claiming that 
these bodies ‘guard’ time, Timaeus could simply be saying we use them to tell time. But many 
scholars read Timaeus as saying something more than that; see Whitrow (1988, 41) and Hussey 
(1983, 141). Timaeus is telling us what time is. Time is the motions of the heavenly bodies. If the 
heavens stopped moving, time itself would stop.  
 Today, we know the earth does not sit at the centre of the universe, and we know the earth 
moves around the sun. Yet people believed otherwise for centuries - and with good reason. The 
earth does not move beneath our feet, and so seems to be unmoving. From the perspective of a 
stargazer, it is the heavens that revolve around the earth: the sun once a day, and the stars once a 
year. How do these celestial bodies move? Aristotle, one-time pupil of Plato, hypothesised they are 
carried on celestial spheres.  
 In Aristotle’s universe, the earth sits at the centre of 56 moving spheres. Heavenly bodies are 
attached to the spheres, and the revolutions of the spheres explain the revolutions of the sun, moon, 
planets, and stars. Figure 1 shows how spheres cocoon the earth [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]: 
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The system explains all kinds of phenomena, including unchanging star constellations. Why do the 
five stars of Cassiopeia stubbornly remain in the same “W” shape? Because they are pinned in place 
on their sphere. This led philosophers to identify time with the motion of the spheres - even 
Aristotle sometimes hints at this view. For example, Aristotle (trans. 1984, Phys 223b18–24) 
associates time with the measure of the outermost ‘celestial sphere’. 
 The basic idea, that time is the motion of celestial stars or spheres, stuck for centuries. It was 
arguably held by Averroës, Aquinas, Copernicus, and Thomas White; see Ariotti (1973) and Thomas 
(2018, 18-22). Later thinkers branded it ‘celestial reductionism’ - the literal reduction of time to 
celestial motions. If the stars sped up, time would quicken. And, if the heavens ceased moving, time 
would halt . 1
2 Absolute Time 
 Very slowly, from the sixteenth century onwards, a new theory of time began to emerge. 
Many of the arguments for it involve thought experiments: experiments we can work through in our 
minds. Philosophers asked, “What would happen to time if the stars stopped moving?”. Many had 
the intuition that if the stars stilled, time would still continue to pass. They also asked, “Can we 
imagine a universe without time?”. Many couldn’t. You can delete everything that exists in the 
universe - people, planets, stars - but it seems impossible to delete time. 
  Sixteenth century scientists Bernadino Telesio and Jan Baptist van Helmont pointed towards 
the new view, by separating time from motion. The first fully-fledged ‘absolute’ account of time 
emerged a bit later, in the 1640s work of Pierre Gassendi (trans. 1972, 384-8). He argued that time 
would continue to flow at the same rate, whether the stars stuttered or sped up. This means that time 
must be a necessary, real being, independent of other things in the universe.  
 Duhem (1985, 296-330) records several thinkers who held that if the heavens stopped rotating, all motions would 1
cease; and that if the heavens sped up, so would time. Many more examples can be found in Hutton (1977, 347-53) and 
Thomas (2018, 18-19).
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Figure 1: The Ptolemaic System. 

Credit: Wikipedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Ptolemaicsystem-small.png
 Gassendi seems to picture time as a kind of immaterial dimension, a ghostly medium 
through which bodies move. It is ‘absolute’ in the sense it doesn’t depend on the stars or celestial 
spheres, or indeed on anything else in the world. For more on this part of the history of absolutism, 
see Hutton (1977) and Thomas (2018, 58-63). 
 In the 1650s, Cambridge philosopher Henry More independently developed another 
absolutism about time. More (repr. 1992, 487) also used thought experiments, arguing that if God 
annihilated the world, and then remade it, time would still pass. However, he puts a new twist on 
the nature of time. 
 More argues there was time before God created the material world, and there will still be 
time after it ends. This means time is eternal, unchanging - ‘never-fading’. This hints at the true 
nature of time: it is an ‘obscure sub-indication’ of God. More (1662, 164; VII: 2) claims that time is 
God’s eternal existence, his attribute of eternity.  
 By naming time an attribute of God, I’ve argued More has avoided a potential objection to 
absolutism. Imagine claiming that a thing exists, and it has various divine qualities, but it’s not the 
Christian God. In the seventeenth century, that would be blasphemy. If time is a real being, and it’s 
uncreated, eternal and unchanging, it could rival God. It would be a second God. George Berkeley 
blasted such a notion as ‘pernicious and absurd’. By identifying time with God, More has ensured 
there is only one divine being, escaping heresy; see Thomas (2018, 55).  
 This kind of absolutism caught on, attracting philosophical giants such as Isaac Barrow, 
John Locke, and Samuel Clarke. Most importantly, it attracted Isaac Newton. His Principia (trans. 
1999, 408–9) stated that absolute time, ‘of its own nature… flows uniformly and by another name is 
called duration’. Later, Newton (trans. 1999, 941) added that God ‘endures always’, and 
‘constitutes’ duration and eternity.  
 In Newton’s hands, absolutism became all the rage. Debate exploded, with time discussed 
far from the university madding crowd, by the likes of farmers and stocking makers; see Thomas 
(2018, 204-6). It even became the subject of poetry. Edward Young’s poem “The Consolation” 
waxes lyrical about boundless time.  
3 Time and the Mind  
 A few decades later, absolute time came under attack again - from Immanuel Kant. He 
turned back to the thought experiments used by absolutists. They had argued that the fact we cannot 
dis-imagine time tells us something about the universe. However, Kant argues it tells us about 
something else altogether: our minds.  
 Kant’s 1781 Critique of Pure Reason argues humans cannot help but imagine a single, 
unified time. However, Kant (repr. 1998, B45-50) argues this is not because time is a real, necessary 
being. Rather, time comes from us: it is a form of thought, a precondition whereby we can 
experience anything. Human minds are wired in such a way that our experiences are always 
temporal. This is why we cannot imagine deleting time from the universe: our minds are not rigged 
to imagine a non-temporal world. Nonetheless, the world outside our heads might be non-temporal. 
Because we must perceive things in time, we do not know what things-in-themselves are like.  
 We can only speak of time from a human standout. Yet Kant leaves open the possibility that 
other, non-human minds are wired differently. As he puts it, ‘we cannot judge at all whether the 
intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that 
are universally valid for us’. Science fiction writers have explored the notion that alien races could 
perceive time differently: see Kurt Vonnegut’s 1969 novel Slaughterhouse-Five, or the 2016 movie 
Arrival. 
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 For Kant, human minds play an active role in constructing our perceptions. The world-in-
itself may not be temporal, but the world humans perceive is. This is a form of ‘idealism’, a family 
of views stressing the activity of mind.  
 The nineteenth century saw waves of idealism sweep Western thought. Kant offers a form of 
‘epistemic’ (knowledge-based) idealism: although things exist outside our minds, our mental 
activity permeates everything we can know about reality. Later philosophers offered 
‘ontological’ (reality-based) idealism: reality is founded on minds. German idealists include Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. British-
American idealists included T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Josiah Royce. Each of their idealisms is 
unique yet they agree that, deep down, time is unreal. We might perceive the world to be in time but 
ultimate reality is timeless.   
4 Time the Twin of Space 
 Despite the popularity of idealism in the nineteenth century, other ideas began brewing. For 
a while now, philosophers had been treating time and space the same way. Gassendi’s time and 
space are both immaterial dimensions. More and Newton agreed that God is the source of time and 
space. Kant held that time and space are human forms of thought. Philosopher Walter Charleton 
(1654, 73) nicknamed time the ‘twin-brother’ of space. 
 Outside of philosophy, it was becoming more common to represent time using space. In 
1765, Joseph Priestley created the world’s first timeline. His 1765 Chart of Biography depicted 
peoples’ lives using lines, across uniform time. Timelines quickly became common, portraying 
empires, evolutionary processes, art history. People were also creating timezones and, by 1900, 
timezones had been mapped onto the whole world. Figure 2 shows an early map of timezones: 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 The 1860s saw the invention of chronophotography - literally, ‘time photography’. It 
captured motion through successive images, as shown here in Étienne-Jules Marey’s photograph of 
pelicans. [INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
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Figure 2: World timezones  

Credit: Wikipedia Commons https:/com/mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:World_Time_Zones_Map.png
His book Movement provides many more haunting examples.  
 In this environment, some Anglo-American philosophers began arguing against idealism 
that time is a real feature of the world. However, time really resembles space. For example, in the 
early twentieth century, Victoria Welby (1907, 384-91) argued our idea of time derives from space. 
She points out that we usually refer to time using spatial ideas, especially line metaphors. We speak 
of ‘vast’ or ‘small’ spaces of time, of short or long ‘lengths’ of time, of the ‘distant’ past and the 
‘near’ future. She argues time has ‘no vocabulary of its own’, borrowing its terminology from 
space. This has a ‘hitherto unsuspected’ significance: space is the primary, original idea, and time is 
secondary to it.  
 On Bertrand Russell’s view, time also resembles space. Russell (1915, 212) argued for 
‘eternalism’: past, present and future times are all real. All parts of space exist: Japan, Australia, and 
England are all equally real. Similarly, he thought all parts of time exist: 2181BCE, 1066CE, and 
2025CE are all equally real. To get at this idea, look at Figure 4, a map representing space : 2




Figure 3: Pelicans from Marey’s Movement  

Credit: Wikipedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Marey_-_birds.jpg
All the parts of space are as real as each other. In the same way, on this simple timeline: 
____________________________ 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
The parts of time - t1, t2, and t3 - are all as real as each other. 
 For Russell, there is nothing special about any one part of space. You might be in London, 
but that doesn’t make London any more special than Edinburgh or Paris. Nor is there is anything 
special about any part of time. The present may seem special: the moment right now, whilst you are 
reading these words, seems more vivid than earlier moments. The present seems to divides the past 
from the future. Yet Russell argues that our belief in a present moment is just that - a belief, the 
product of human psychology. Russell (1915, 212) claims that if there were no humans, an event 
occurring at t1 would still happen before an event occurring at t2. But in that world ‘there would be 
no past, present, or future’.  
 I suspect the intertwining of time and space fuelled the rise of Victorian time travel stories. 
There are no directions in space: you can move up, down, north, south, left, right. If all the parts of 
time exist, there may be no direction in time either. We often think that time has a one-way 
direction, into the future. Space-time symmetry raises the possibility of travelling in another 
direction: into the past. We can hop on a train leaving London for Cairo, and hop into a time 
machine leaving Brexit London for Shakespearian London.  
 H. G. Wells’ 1895 novel The Time Machine led the time travel charge. It features a time 
traveller that may have been ‘swept back into the past’, doomed to wander ‘some plesiosaurus-
haunted Oolitic coral reef’, or ‘the lonely saline lakes of the Triassic Age’. Time travel stories 
mushroomed, including Mark Twain’s 1889 A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court and Edith 
Nesbit’s 1906 The Story of the Amulet. Surprisingly, it took philosophy decades to take time travel 
seriously: J. J. C. Smart published the first substantial discussion in 1963. 
  
5 Pure Time: Durée 
 French philosopher Henri Bergson also rejected the view that time is unreal. But he watched 
the ongoing ‘spatialisation’ of time with dismay. From the 1880s to 1930s, he argued against 
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Figure 4: Map of space  

Credit: Wikipedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:BlankMap-Europe-v4.png
‘mathematical time’, which involves space. Timelines illustrate mathematical time - have another 
look at the one above. It represents time spatially, stringing countable moments out along a line. 
Time becomes static, motionless. Bergson argues this misses the true, pure nature of time. 
 Pure time is durée. It is ‘free from all alloy’, as it does not involve space. Unlike 
mathematical time, pure time is not divisible into countable units. Bergson implies that pure 
duration can only be experienced by conscious beings. When we listen to music, a C note can melt 
into a D note in such a way that we cannot mark one note off from one another. The past and 
present notes form an organic whole that cannot be divided into units, and this is how we 
experience durée. Pure time is melting, changing, motion.  
 As time is really unlike space, Bergson argues we can only travel through it one-way:  
If I glance over a road marked on the map and follow it up to a certain point, there is nothing to 
prevent my turning back and trying to find out whether it branches off anywhere. But time is not a 
line along which one can pass again. (Bergson, trans. 1910, 181) 
Although we cannot travel backwards in time, Bergson accepts the reality of the past. His view is 
partly based in psychology.  
 In that period, philosopher-psychologists Shadworth Hodgson and William James were 
pondering time perception. How much time humans do perceive at any one moment? See Andersen 
& Grush (2009) on their debates. Do we perceive the tiniest possible slice of time - an 
infinitesimally small present? This tiny slice might be some fraction of a microsecond. Or, do we 
perceive a larger slice, known as the ‘specious’ or roomy present? This might last as long as a 
second.  
 Hodgson and James argued we perceive a specious present, using human perceptions of 
change. Imagine watching traffic lights changing from red to green. We seem to literally perceive 
the change: we see the lights turn from red to green. This implies we perceive a specious present, 
perhaps lasting as long as a second. As Bergson puts it, our lived presents have duration.   
 Bergson (trans. 1911, 176-194) builds on this view to advance an ontology of time. He 
argues that as we perceive a span of time, we must perceive the infinitesimally small moment that is 
present and the past moments preceding it. If we perceive the past, it must exist. Bergson concludes, 
‘the survival of the past… forces itself upon philosophers’.  
 Although the past exists, the future doesn’t. Bergson argues that the future is still unfolding, 
and we can still affect it. This view, on which the past and present are real yet future is unreal, is the 
‘growing block’ view of time. The ‘block’ of reality, the past and present, are ever growing into the 
future. As time moves forward, it literally brings new things into existence. Time is a creative force.  
 Although Bergson is no longer well known within the Anglophone world, his views were 
powerful. He publicly debated the nature of time with Albert Einstein, and went on to won a Nobel 
prize for his bestselling books.  
6 Unreal Time Strikes Again   
 Many thinkers railed against idealism, including Welby, Russell, and Bergson. But idealism 
had not quite perished. In Britain, a second wave of idealism took hold in the early twentieth 
century. In 1908, it yielded what would become an infamous piece of philosophy: J. M. E. 
McTaggart’s (1908) article “The Unreality of Time”. Akin to Kant and Hegel, McTaggart aimed to 
show that reality is ultimately timeless. To reach this old conclusion, he offered a new argument.  
 Imagine three events: a girl builds a sandcastle, the tide comes up, ocean-waves dissolve the 
sandcastle. How do we order them? Like series of numbers, McTaggart put events into two series. 
Both the ‘A series’ and the ‘B series’ order events according to whether they are earlier or later. 
The tide rises after the sandcastle is built, and before the waves hit the beach.  
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 Additionally, the A series takes some event to be special - present. It brands earlier events 
past, and later ones are future. If the tide rising is the present moment, then the sandcastle was built 
in the past, and the waves will sweep away the sandcastle in the future.  
 McTaggart’s argument against time has two steps. First, he argues the A series is essential to 
time. On the B series, nothing changes, for every event will always occupy the same position in 
time: the waves will always hit the sandcastle after the tide rises. In contrast, on the A series, things 
really change as the present moves on: the tide rising was once present, and is now past. The castle-
destroying waves are future but will be present. McTaggart claims this kind of change, from future 
to present to past, is essential to time.  
 Second, McTaggart argues that the A series cannot exist. Being future, present, and past are 
incompatible, contradictory properties. An event can be future or past - not both. Yet, McTaggart 
argues, every event has all these properties: the rising tide was once future, then present, then past. 
As these properties are contradictory, he concludes they are unreal. If the A series is essential to 
time, and the A series does not exist, then time does not exist. Time is unreal. 
 This deceptively simple argument has proved knotty to unravel. McTaggart’s article was just 
17 pages long. Philosophers have since written tens of thousands of pages about it. Many have tried 
to show where it goes wrong, from McTaggart’s peers C. D. Broad and Hilda Oakeley, to 
contemporary philosophers Robin le Poidevin and Hugh Mellor. Occasionally, philosophers like 
Michael Dummett defend it. However, McTaggart’s argument is not just important because of its 
conclusion. 
7 A Theory vs B Theory  
 The argument also matters because it spawned two views with fiercely humdrum labels: A 
theory and B theory. These stem from McTaggart’s A and B series, which provided a new 
framework to discuss time. All realists about time agree that events occur before or after one 
another. But is there really a moving present?  
 ‘B theory’ says no. Russell was an early B theorist, and B theory usually comes packaged 
with his view that all parts of time exist. In contrast, ‘A theory’ says yes - there really is a moving 
present. Bergson was an early A theorist, and his growing block view inspired other A theories, such 
as C. D. Broad’s.  
 As the twentieth century moved on, the A versus B debate thrived. Richard Gale offered an 
impassioned defence of A Theory. Donald Williams argued for B theory, decrying a ‘repulsive’ 
moving present. Memorably, Williams (1951, 471-2) describes A theories as a ‘primitive magma of 
confusion’. And the A versus B debate shows no sign of abating - recent guides to the philosophy of 
time are still riddled with it.  
Questions About Time: Pansies or Tulips? 
 Time has been sourced in crystalline spheres, in God, in a moving present. Can this 
evolution in philosophy tell us anything else? I believe so. We often think philosophical questions 
are ‘perennial’, recurring throughout history like metaphysical tulips. Yet in the case of time, many 
of the questions do not recur. Would time stop if the stars stopped? Is time God’s eternity? These 
questions are deeply rooted in particular eras - like the ephemeral lives of pansies or petunias. 
 I think the questions we ask now will also turn out to be pansies, rather than tulips. Is the 
special present? Does the future exist? These may seem like perennial questions but they have only 
bedevilled philosophers for the last hundred years or so. Philosophy might return to the same topics 
time after time (pun intended). But its questions, like everything else in the world, change.  
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